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| - | ====== Challenges Ahead ====== | ||
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| - | Verification and Validation Capability: | ||
| - | - Components: Validation of AI components continue to be a stumbling block to overall safety. Continued research is required on methods to mathematically measure completeness, | ||
| - | - Scalability: | ||
| - | - Progressive structure: To project trust from consumers and regulators, the industry must develop a clear process which shows a progressive structure of safety progress. A key part of this process are clear arguments for lack of regression of functionality in OTA updates and inclusion of feedback from field failures. | ||
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| - | Verification and Validation Test Apparatuses | ||
| - | - Virtual: As methodologies develop for V&V, virtual testing tools will be required to support them. This means that the work done in standards organizations such as ASAM must continue as a key enabling feature to develop these methodologies. | ||
| - | - Physical: Test tracks must continue to adapt to support their key functions in the overall flow. Specifically, | ||
| - | - EMI: Due to the heavy use of active sensing technologies, | ||
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| - | Cybersecurity: | ||
| - | - Systematic risk: Networked cyber-physical systems are introducing the notion of systematic risk to bad actors. Governmental oversight is required to ensure that all levels of this chain from physical security to the software architecture are fully dependable. | ||
| - | - Sensors: Various electronics modalities (e.g., LiDAR, radar, GPS) are critical to autonomous operation while also being vulnerable to spoofing. Research is required to detect and mitigate these spoofing effects. | ||
| - | - Cyber-security: | ||
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| - | Supply Chain: | ||
| - | - Economics: The economics of semiconductors will limit the development of chips for limited volume markets. Thus, developing methodologies which provide security, reliability and performance from Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) products is critical for success. | ||
| - | - Design: Field maintainability, | ||
| - | - Supply Chain: In the construction of supply chain relationship, | ||
| - | - Hardware Fabrics: Building on a minimal number of high -volume semiconductor chips is critical to the long- term viability of the LLC supply chain. To enable this process, a broader concept of hardware programmable fabrics which include software, digital hardware, and analog/ | ||
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| - | Finally, at a systems level there are two strong recommendations: | ||
| - | - Integrated Functional Approach: V&V, Cybersecurity, | ||
| - | - Learnings from adjacent fields: Automotive is the largest cyber-physical marketplace. The critical learnings from automotive for other ground vehicles as well as adjacent fields such as airborne, space, and marine systems is highly recommended. | ||