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| ====== Introduction to Validation and Verification in Autonomy ====== | ====== Introduction to Validation and Verification in Autonomy ====== | ||
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| - | <todo @rahulrazdan # | ||
| As discussed in the governance module, whatever value products provide to their consumers is weighed against the potential harm caused by the product, and leads to the concept of legal product liability. From a product development perspective, | As discussed in the governance module, whatever value products provide to their consumers is weighed against the potential harm caused by the product, and leads to the concept of legal product liability. From a product development perspective, | ||
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| In most cases, the generic V&V process must grapple with massive ODD spaces, limited execution capacity, and high cost of evaluation. Further, all of this must be done in a timely manner to make the product available to the marketplace. Traditionally, | In most cases, the generic V&V process must grapple with massive ODD spaces, limited execution capacity, and high cost of evaluation. Further, all of this must be done in a timely manner to make the product available to the marketplace. Traditionally, | ||
| - | **Physics-Based Operating Domains** | + | ===== Physics-Based Operating Domains |
| For MaVV, the critical factors are the efficiency of the MiVV “engine” and the argument for the completeness of the validation. Historically, | For MaVV, the critical factors are the efficiency of the MiVV “engine” and the argument for the completeness of the validation. Historically, | ||
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| - Confirmation and Audit: Use independent confirmation measures (e.g., safety audits, assessment reviews) to ensure the braking system complies with ISO 26262. | - Confirmation and Audit: Use independent confirmation measures (e.g., safety audits, assessment reviews) to ensure the braking system complies with ISO 26262. | ||
| - | <note important> | ||
| Finally, the regulations have a strong idea of safety levels with Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL). Airborne systems follow a similar trajectory (pun intended) with the concept of Design Assurance Levels (DALs). A key part of the V&V task is to meet the standards required at each ASIL level. Historically, | Finally, the regulations have a strong idea of safety levels with Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL). Airborne systems follow a similar trajectory (pun intended) with the concept of Design Assurance Levels (DALs). A key part of the V&V task is to meet the standards required at each ASIL level. Historically, | ||
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| - In safety situations, regulations focused on a process to demonstrate safety with a key idea of design assurance levels. | - In safety situations, regulations focused on a process to demonstrate safety with a key idea of design assurance levels. | ||
| - | TRADITIONAL DECISION-BASED EXECUTION | + | ===== Traditional Decision-based Execution ===== |
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| As cyber-physical systems evolved, information technology (IT) rapidly transformed the world. | As cyber-physical systems evolved, information technology (IT) rapidly transformed the world. | ||
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| **A key implication of the DBE space is that the idea from the PBE world of building a list of faults and building a safety argument for them is antithetical to the focus of DBE validation.** | **A key implication of the DBE space is that the idea from the PBE world of building a list of faults and building a safety argument for them is antithetical to the focus of DBE validation.** | ||
| - | <note important> | ||
| Finally, the product development process is typically focused on defining an ODD and validating against that situation. However, in modern times, an additional concern is that of adversarial attacks (cybersecurity). In this situation, an adversary wants to high jack the system for nefarious intent. In this situation, the product owner must not only validate against the ODD, but also detect when the system is operating outside the ODD. After detection, the best case scenario is to safely redirect the system to the ODD space. The risk associated with cybersecurity issues typically split at three levels for cyber-physical systems: | Finally, the product development process is typically focused on defining an ODD and validating against that situation. However, in modern times, an additional concern is that of adversarial attacks (cybersecurity). In this situation, an adversary wants to high jack the system for nefarious intent. In this situation, the product owner must not only validate against the ODD, but also detect when the system is operating outside the ODD. After detection, the best case scenario is to safely redirect the system to the ODD space. The risk associated with cybersecurity issues typically split at three levels for cyber-physical systems: | ||