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en:safeav:as:vvintro [2026/04/08 10:09] – airien:safeav:as:vvintro [2026/04/08 11:06] (current) – raivo.sell
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   - Confirmation and Audit: Use independent confirmation measures (e.g., safety audits, assessment reviews) to ensure the braking system complies with ISO 26262.   - Confirmation and Audit: Use independent confirmation measures (e.g., safety audits, assessment reviews) to ensure the braking system complies with ISO 26262.
  
 +<note important>2x Finally, seems like different chapter</note>
 Finally, the regulations have a strong idea of safety levels with Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL). Airborne systems follow a similar trajectory (pun intended) with the concept of Design Assurance Levels (DALs). A key part of the V&V task is to meet the standards required at each ASIL level. Historically, a sophisticated set of V&V techniques has been developed to verify traditional automotive systems. These techniques included well-structured physical tests, often validated by regulators, or sanctioned independent companies (ex TUV-Sud [7]). Over the years, the use of virtual physics-based models has increased to model design tasks such as body design [8] or tire performance [9]. The general structure of these models is to build  a simulation which is predictive of the underlying physics to enable broader ODD exploration. This creates a very important characterization, model generation, predictive execution, and correction flow. Finally, because the execution is highly constrained by physics, virtual simulators can have limited performance and often require extensive hardware support for simulation acceleration. In summary, the key underpinnings of the PBE paradigm from a V&V point of view are:  Finally, the regulations have a strong idea of safety levels with Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL). Airborne systems follow a similar trajectory (pun intended) with the concept of Design Assurance Levels (DALs). A key part of the V&V task is to meet the standards required at each ASIL level. Historically, a sophisticated set of V&V techniques has been developed to verify traditional automotive systems. These techniques included well-structured physical tests, often validated by regulators, or sanctioned independent companies (ex TUV-Sud [7]). Over the years, the use of virtual physics-based models has increased to model design tasks such as body design [8] or tire performance [9]. The general structure of these models is to build  a simulation which is predictive of the underlying physics to enable broader ODD exploration. This creates a very important characterization, model generation, predictive execution, and correction flow. Finally, because the execution is highly constrained by physics, virtual simulators can have limited performance and often require extensive hardware support for simulation acceleration. In summary, the key underpinnings of the PBE paradigm from a V&V point of view are: 
  
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 **A key implication of the DBE space is that the idea from the PBE world of building a list of faults and building a safety argument for them is antithetical to the focus of DBE validation.** **A key implication of the DBE space is that the idea from the PBE world of building a list of faults and building a safety argument for them is antithetical to the focus of DBE validation.**
 +<note important>2x Finally, seems like different chapter</note>
  
 Finally, the product development process is typically focused on defining an ODD and validating against that situation. However, in modern times, an additional concern is that of adversarial attacks (cybersecurity). In this situation, an adversary wants to high jack the system for nefarious intent. In this situation, the product owner must not only validate against the ODD, but also detect when the system is operating outside the ODD. After detection, the best case scenario is to safely redirect the system to the ODD space. The risk associated with cybersecurity issues typically split at three levels for cyber-physical systems: Finally, the product development process is typically focused on defining an ODD and validating against that situation. However, in modern times, an additional concern is that of adversarial attacks (cybersecurity). In this situation, an adversary wants to high jack the system for nefarious intent. In this situation, the product owner must not only validate against the ODD, but also detect when the system is operating outside the ODD. After detection, the best case scenario is to safely redirect the system to the ODD space. The risk associated with cybersecurity issues typically split at three levels for cyber-physical systems:
en/safeav/as/vvintro.txt · Last modified: by raivo.sell
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